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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and scholars have long sought to illuminate the relationship 
between state and federal constitutional law.  Yet their attention, like the 
relationship itself, has largely been one-sided:  State courts have 
consistently adopted federal constitutional law as their own, and scholars 
have attempted to illuminate why this is, and why it should or should not 
be so.  By contrast, federal courts tend not to look to state constitutional 
law, even for persuasive authority.  Nor have scholars argued at any 
length that federal courts can or should look to state constitutional law 
for guidance in answering the many constitutional questions common to 
the federal and state systems. 
This short Article attempts to turn the focus around, by asking what 
state constitutional law can tell us about the federal constitution.  The 
thesis explored here is that federal constitutional doctrine can and 
sometimes should do more to draw on state constitutional law, 
particularly when that law addresses—as it often does—analogous 
language or problems with which the federal courts have little 
experience.  The Article calls this idea “reverse incorporation” for lack of 
a better phrase, but “federal constitutional borrowing of state 
constitutional law” would probably be more accurate, if a bit clunkier.  In 
any event, the phrase is not meant to invoke the “reverse” incorporation 
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CAL. L. REV. 323 (2012), which addresses in greater detail the thesis briefly described 
here. 
My thanks to the law school for hosting the symposium, to Jamison Colburn and 
Gary Gildin for organizing it, to participants—especially Robert Williams and Jim 
Rossi—for their valuable feedback, to participants in the Cornell Constitutional Law 
Colloquium—especially Josh Chafetz, Michael Dorf, and Aziz Rana—and to Thomas 
Dominic for research assistance. 
 1036 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:4 
associated with Bolling v. Sharpe,
1
 but to denote a wide range of “uses”:  
from looking to state doctrine as persuasive authority in federal cases to 
using it to define federal law. 
Elsewhere, I have described this thesis in depth, considered some of 
the arguments for and against it, and sketched out some tentative 
normative claims about when and how federal constitutional law should 
draw more from state constitutional law.
2
  This short piece presents an 
abbreviated version of the major arguments for and against such 
borrowing.  It then goes on to address how reverse incorporation, like 
any interpretive tool, must be tailored to one’s preferred constitutional 
theory and to the particular constitutional issue presented.  An originalist 
and a pragmatist will have very different uses for state constitutional law, 
for example, and will use it differently in Eighth Amendment cases than 
in Due Process cases.  After identifying some of the concerns relevant to 
that kind of theory—and issue-tailoring, the Article concludes by 
addressing some general questions about the normative vision behind 
reverse incorporation. 
I. REVERSE INCORPORATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Federal and state constitutions are interrelated in their history, text, 
traditions, and doctrine.  State-level rights guarantees served as the 
model for many of the most familiar features of the Bill of Rights and of 
American constitutional law.
3
  As Justice Brennan noted, “Prior to the 
adoption of the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually 
recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in 
one or more state constitutions.”4  But for a variety of reasons, arguably 
including the decline of state identity and inarguably including the rise of 
 
 1. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  In that case, the Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment—whose language refers only to the states—applies to the federal 
government, a conclusion sometimes referred to as reverse incorporation.  I use “reverse” 
to capture the fact that the approach I describe encourages the application of state 
constitutional law in federal doctrine.  This is in some sense the “reverse” of the usual 
constitutional incorporation, which applies federal doctrine against the states.  Id. at 500. 
 2. See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011). 
 3. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 989, 989 (1996) (“State charters are the foundation of American Constitutional 
law.”); see generally Gordon S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the 
American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 911 (1993) (discussing the role of state 
constitutions in establishing “the primary conceptions of America’s political and 
constitutional culture”). 
 4. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977). 
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incorporation doctrine,
5
 federal constitutional law eventually took center 
stage.  Because federal rights guarantees came to bind the states in 
almost all particulars, and because the Warren Court interpreted those 
guarantees so broadly, the states’ own constitutional guarantees became 
essentially superfluous.
6
  Constitutional litigation focused on federal 
rights, and state constitutional doctrine withered. 
The perceived retraction of federal rights guarantees—particularly 
those of criminal defendants—under the Burger Court inspired 
something of a state constitutional law renaissance, or at least inspired 
calls for one.  Often referred to as the “New Judicial Federalism,” this 
revitalization of state constitutional law was closely associated with 
Justice Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review article, which called on 
state courts to interpret broadly their states’ constitutional guarantees.7 
The idea, of course, was that state constitutional doctrine—once 
sidelined by the Warren Court’s expansive jurisprudence—might exceed 
the federal floor and guarantee rights left unprotected by the Supreme 
Court. 
Despite Brennan’s entreaties, many if not most state courts 
continued to apply federal constitutional law as if it where their own. 
This approach, long lamented by many scholars of state constitutional 
law (not to mention state judges), is known as “lockstepping,”8 and 
remains perhaps the most common mode of state constitutional 
decisiomaking.
9
  Of course, the fact that state courts tend to adopt federal 
doctrine does not mean that they are obligated to do so.  Indeed, 
Brennan’s invitation remains open:  State courts are free to interpret their 
state constitutional rights guarantees more broadly (or less, though not to 
 
 5. See David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 274, 280 (1992) (arguing that incorporation doctrine “resulted from the 
unwillingness of many state courts, particularly in the South, to use their own 
constitutions to protect their citizens from state overreaching”). 
 6. James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Foreword, The New Frontier of State 
Constitutional Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2005) (noting that after the 
Warren Court’s expansive reading of individual rights, “state constitutional law was seen, 
not illogically, as in some fundamental way subordinate to national constitutional law”). 
 7. Brennan, supra note 4; Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate 
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (describing 
Brennan’s article as the “Magna Carta of state constitutional law”). 
 8. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial 
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 102 (2000) (“Under the lockstep approach, the 
state constitutional analysis begins and ends with consideration of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”). 
 9. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as 
an Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004) 
(“Despite . . . criticism, the lockstep approach remains the most common approach to 
state constitutionalism.”). 
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any effect)
10
 than the federal courts do analogous federal guarantees.  
And yet in practice state courts essentially treat federal constitutional law 
as if it were, if not binding, at least a strong form of persuasive authority. 
There is, however, no reason why federal courts could not engage in 
the same kind of borrowing when, for example, they confront 
constitutional issues on which state constitutional law is well-developed 
and federal constitutional law is not.  After all, federal constitutional law 
is no more (or less) bound by state constitutional law than state 
constitutional law is bound by federal law.
11
  Federal judges are therefore 
just as free as their state counterparts to use the other’s law as guidance, 
and occasionally issues arise for which the states have a relatively 
uniform and well-developed jurisprudence on a question with which the 
federal courts have little or no experience.  The standard of review 
applicable to the “individual” right to bear arms is a timely example: 
Every state court to reach the question has employed a “reasonableness” 
standard for evaluating gun control laws,
12
 and yet the Supreme Court in 
Heller
13
 and McDonald
14
 apparently declined to adopt such a test.
15
 
But pointing out an asymmetry is not the same as making a 
convincing case for its correction, and so it is important to consider some 
of the arguments for and against federal borrowing of state constitutional 
law.  I have explored these issues in more depth elsewhere,
16
 but a short 
summary is perhaps appropriate, beginning with the arguments in favor. 
First, increased use of state constitutional law may help vindicate 
our constitutional commitment to federalism.  States are often said to be 
“laboratories” whose experimentation with law and policy should be 
encouraged,
17
 and federal borrowing of state constitutional law provides 
 
 10. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 1123, 1127 (1992) (“[N]othing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts 
from interpreting state law more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are 
barred [by the Supremacy Clause] from enforcing the less-protective state law.”). 
 11. The Supremacy Clause may render state constitutional law irrelevant where it 
conflicts with federal law, but that does not necessarily mean that state courts must 
interpret state constitutional law so as to avoid such conflict. 
 12. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 
686-87 (2007). 
 13. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008). 
 14. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010). 
 15. It is not entirely clear whether the McDonald plurality rejected the 
reasonableness test or simply declined to adopt it.  Elsewhere, it approvingly cited a brief 
filed by thirty-eight state attorneys general arguing that “[s]tate and local experimentation 
with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second Amendment.”  Id. at 
3046. 
 16. See Blocher, supra note 2, at Part II. 
 17. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
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a relatively straightforward way for federal courts to learn from those lab 
experiments.  If the state courts say that the exclusionary rule is the only 
way to prevent police misconduct, for example, then federal courts might 
be well served to follow the same path when developing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.
18
  Moreover, on a more theoretical level, if 
federalism is supposed to divide or share power between the political 
branches of the state and federal governments, why not do the same with 
interpretive power within the judiciary? 
Second, state constitutional law can serve as a relatively “objective” 
measure of current constitutional values.  Of course, contemporary 
constitutional values are not relevant to all interpretive theories, nor to all 
legal issues.  But they are often thought to be important when it comes to 
questions like what punishments are “cruel and unusual” and therefore 
violate the Eighth Amendment,
19
 or what rights are “fundamental” to a 
scheme of ordered liberty and thus incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.20  A 
widespread and generally uniform state constitutional practice can be 
useful evidence in that regard.  If state constitutions unanimously 
prohibit a certain punishment, for example, then it may be more 
confidently said that the punishment is “cruel and unusual” for the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.
21
  To the contrary, if the practice is 
widely accepted, that may be evidence of its constitutionality.
22
 
Third, borrowing of state constitutional law would appear to be a 
near-ideal kind of comparative constitutional law—a mode of 
interpretation that attempts to derive lessons from the similarities and 
 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 18. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1039 (2003) 
(noting that when it applied the exclusionary rule against the states, “the Court was 
deeply influenced by an emerging consensus among state courts, which it carefully and 
extensively documented, that suppression of illegally seized evidence was the most 
effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches”). 
 19. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
 20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). 
 21. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (finding that execution of juveniles 
violates the Eighth Amendment based in part on the fact that thirty states and the federal 
government do not do so); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 (2002) (similar 
analysis and conclusion for mentally retarded offenders).  This attention to state practice 
is in many ways a natural outgrowth of the modern Eighth Amendment doctrine, which 
the Court has said “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Id. at 311-12; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-
61. 
 22. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Eighth 
Amendment challenge to method of execution based in part on the fact that thirty six 
states and the federal government employ that method). 
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differences among legal systems.
23
  Comparativism is obviously 
extremely controversial, but even those wary of the practice regularly say 
that it is less troubling, and may even be acceptable, where the 
comparator legal system is either based on or similar to our own.
24
  In 
that sense, states are a perfect target for comparative analysis.  They have 
much of the same constitutional language, similar traditions, and are in 
fact part of the very same constitutional system as the federal 
constitution.
25
  Indeed, this particular argument in favor of borrowing 
may become stronger the more one doubts that states have any 
meaningful, independent identity. 
But of course none of these arguments (nor any other) is necessarily 
a stand-alone winner, and depending on one’s theory of interpretation or 
the constitutional question at issue, they may not have any cachet at all. 
And thus it is also important to describe and address some of the 
arguments against federal borrowing of state constitutional law.
26
  The 
following discussion reviews three of the strongest. 
First, there seems to be a general feeling that state constitutional law 
is not “good” enough to shape federal constitutional doctrine.  This 
impression may partially be a comment on the perceived quality of state 
constitutions or the judges who interpret them, but there are also 
structural reasons that may be relevant.  One could say, for example, that 
the easy amendability of state constitutions and the election of state 
judges makes state constitutional law too malleable and politically 
sensitive to represent the kind of “timeless” constitutional values we 
associate with the federal constitution.
27
  After all, it is not hard to find 
examples of state judges losing their seats after handing down 
 
 23. See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001) (surveying the practice of comparative constitutionalism and 
suggesting a model for its proper use); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) (similar). 
 24. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, 
in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN 
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“Now that 
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United 
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their 
own deliberative process.”). 
 25. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 359 (“[T]he differences between the relevant state constitutions 
and the federal constitution are much smaller than the differences involved in the 
transnational comparisons that are a staple of comparative constitutional law.”). 
 26. See Blocher, supra note 2, Part II.B. 
 27. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 287-88 (2008).  As Pozen notes elsewhere, judicial elections at the state level might 
nonetheless serve a useful role as instruments of popular constitutionalism.  See generally 
David Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 
(2010). 
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constitutional rulings protecting politically unpopular groups or rights.
28
 
Just this past year, the Iowa judges who held that their state constitution 
protected a right to same-sex marriage were punished at the polls.
29
  This 
may be troubling, as it suggests that judges might under-protect minority 
rights in order to stay on the bench.  And yet in some areas of federal 
constitutional law, and for some interpretive theories, a degree of 
responsiveness may be a strength, such as when it comes to measuring 
beliefs about what constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment or what 
rights are “fundamental.” 
Second, it may well be that federal borrowing of state constitutional 
law is impossible because state constitutions are simply too different—
either from the federal document or from each other—for comparativism 
to be useful.  There are, of course, significant differences between state 
and federal constitutions.  And yet there are also significant areas of 
overlap in terms of intent, structure, tradition, and text, particularly when 
it comes to the kinds of individual rights guarantees captured in the 
federal Bill of Rights.
30
  Those similarities, after all, are what makes 
lockstepping possible (even if undesirable) at the state level.  Moreover, 
state constitutions have enough in common with each other to enable the 
kind of inter-state borrowing chronicled by many scholars of state 
constitutional law.
31
 
Finally, there are arguments against borrowing state constitutional 
law that derive not from the nature of state constitutional law, but from 
the nature of federal constitutional interpretation.  If one believes that the 
federal constitution should be interpreted in line with the intents, 
understandings, or expected applications of the Founders, for example, 
state constitutional doctrine might seem to be irrelevant at best and 
distorting at worst.  This objection is not easy to answer in general terms. 
Indeed, it demonstrates that reverse incorporation can be used as an 
interpretive tool in many different ways, depending on the constitutional 
issue before a court and on the court’s own theory of interpretation.  The 
 
 28. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California 
Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 
JUDICATURE 348 (1987) (describing successful campaign to unseat Rose Bird and 
colleagues on the California Supreme Court). 
 29. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2010, at A1. 
 30. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 
63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1985) (noting that the federal Framers “derived much of 
their inspiration from guarantees provided by the colonies that became the original 
states”). 
 31. See generally Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 835 (1997); Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A 
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 179-80 (1985). 
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following Part attempts to push the argument forward by addressing 
some of those concerns. 
II. WHEN AND HOW MUCH TO BORROW 
The reverse incorporation described here is an interpretive tool, not 
an interpretive theory.  As such, it does not provide complete or clear-cut 
answers to constitutional questions, nor is it self-justifying.  In order to 
fully determine whether and how state constitutional law can usefully be 
imported into federal constitutional doctrine, one must have a thicker 
notion of what constitutional interpretation should be and what it should 
hope to achieve.  A complete constitutional theory is far beyond the 
scope of this or any Article, but Section II.A advances some general 
observations that may be relevant for determining when and how the tool 
of reverse incorporation can be used consistently with various 
constitutional theories.  It is similarly impossible to say whether or how 
this tool would be useful in each and every type of constitutional case, 
but Section II.B suggests some possible considerations. 
A. Tailoring to Theory 
Constitutional theory can shape the usefulness of reverse 
incorporation at two points:  First, in determining whether to borrow 
state constitutional law; and second, in determining how much weight 
should be given to that law.  That is, one must ask first whether and 
when an interpretive theory permits borrowing of state constitutional 
law, and—if it does—then ask how it employs that which is borrowed. 
The answers to these questions need not necessarily track each other. 
One can, for example, give an enthusiastically affirmative answer to the 
first question by saying that borrowing of state constitutional law is 
widely permissible, while hedging on the second question by saying that 
it is useful only as persuasive authority, or vice versa. 
The ways in which one answers those two questions—the 
permissibility and importance of reverse incorporation—will almost 
certainly depend on one’s preferred method of constitutional 
interpretation.  An originalist, for example, might reject the broad use of 
contemporary state constitutional law on the grounds that it does not 
relate to the Founding-era intent or understanding of the people who 
wrote and ratified the federal constitution—the usual tools of originalist 
interpretation.
32
  And yet even the most committed originalist will 
 
 32. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851-52 
(1989) (explaining that the “‘originalist’ approach to constitutional interpretation” 
includes “examining various evidence, including not only, of course, the text of the 
Constitution and its overall structure, but also the contemporaneous understanding”). 
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presumably look with interest to the Founding-era state constitutional 
law that informed, and may help illuminate, the meaning of the federal 
document.
33
  Justice Scalia did precisely this in his self-consciously 
originalist opinion in Heller.
34
  Indeed, many of the most recognizable 
features of American constitutionalism (including judicial review)
35
 were 
first found in state constitutional law.  To the degree that this is so, state 
constitutional law may prove to be an especially strong—and perhaps 
determinative—tool of originalist federal constitutional interpretation.  In 
other words, it may be narrowly but highly relevant. 
Similarly, textualism, which is often originalism’s fellow traveler,36 
focuses on the meaning of the words in the federal constitution as being 
the primary (or arguably sole) relevant piece of interpretive information. 
For much the same reason as it should be relevant to originalists, state 
constitutional law should be of assistance to textualists, for the simple 
reason that state constitutions have language that is in many instances 
identical to that of the federal constitution.
37
  Indeed, they served as its 
model.
38
  So if one seeks insight into the meaning of the words in the 
latter, the language of the former can presumably be extremely 
illuminating. 
Another major set of constitutional theories may be grouped 
together (again, very roughly) under the heading “living 
constitutionalism.”  Like originalism and textualism, living 
constitutionalism comes in many forms.  One major strain focuses on 
what might be called the “moral evolution” of society—the degree to 
which our shared moral commitments and beliefs have changed since the 
Framing, and how those changes can or should be effectuated in 
constitutional doctrine.  For adherents to this approach, state 
constitutional law should be an especially useful barometer, since it is 
 
 33. Id. at 852 (noting that originalist analysis also includes examination of “the 
various state constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted”). 
 34. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584-88, 
590 n.13, 591-93, 599-606, 612-15, 628-30 (2008). 
 35. H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 
ALB. L. REV. 283, 294 (1989) (“Only the eclipse of state constitutional law has led to 
Marbury’s enthronement as the case that ‘established’ judicial review.”). 
 36. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 
731 (2010) (“[O]riginalism-driven textualism has assumed an increasingly prominent role 
in constitutional interpretation, at least within the academy.”). 
 37. Gardner, supra note 18, at 1029 (“[T]he texts of the state constitutions are, at 
many critical points, similar or even identical to one another and to parallel provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 38. Brennan, supra note 4, at 501 (arguing that state court decisions in the 1960s and 
1970s “put[] to rest the notion that state constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror 
the federal Bill of Rights.  The lesson of history is otherwise; indeed, the drafters of the 
federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state 
constitutions.”). 
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ultimately more malleable (responsive to changing moral commitments, 
that is) than the federal constitution.  Changing interpretations of what 
punishments are permissible, for example, can be solid “objective” 
evidence of society’s moral commitments.39  Another major strain of 
living constitutionalism is distinctly pragmatic in nature.  It focuses less 
on moral commitments and more on the social impact of constitutional 
rules.  Justice Breyer is often said to display such a pragmatic approach, 
frequently reciting and deferring to legislative fact-finding and policy 
decisions.
40
  For pragmatists, state constitutional law may be useful 
inasmuch as it demonstrates the results of the states’ service as 
“laboratories of experimentation.”  For example, in considering whether 
to incorporate the exclusionary rule against the states, the Court in Mapp 
looked to the experience of California, which had concluded as a matter 
of state constitutional law that the exclusionary rule was the only 
practical way to deter police misconduct.
41
 
Of course, this broad and shallow overview does not begin to give 
sufficient attention to the interpretive theories it mentions, much less the 
many theories it does not.  But the point is not to rework the Article’s 
thesis repeatedly for all approaches to constitutional interpretation—or 
the uncountable permutations thereof—but rather to show that, like any 
interpretive tool, the usefulness of reverse incorporation will vary 
according to one’s preferred theory.  That may not make it any more 
universal than any other interpretive tool, but neither is it any less so. 
B. Tailoring to Questions 
There is another variable likely to impact the usefulness of state 
constitutional law as an interpretive tool—the nature of the constitutional 
case at issue.  As with interpretive theories, different types of 
constitutional cases may call for different uses of state constitutional law, 
and may impact both the breadth and the strength of reliance on state 
constitutional law.  And as with interpretive theories, the breadth and 
strength of use need not necessarily track one another. 
 
 39. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (relying on current state 
law as “objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (same). 
 40. See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist 
Constitutional Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 
266 n.390 (2002) (noting “Justice Breyer’s tendency to defer to Congress as a co-equal 
branch of government and his deference to government more generally”). 
 41. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (citing People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 
911 (Cal. 1955)).  See also Gardner, supra note 1818, at 1039 (“[T]he Court was deeply 
influenced by an emerging consensus among state courts, which it carefully and 
extensively documented, that suppression of illegally seized evidence was the most 
effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches.”). 
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One could, for example, say that state constitutional law is broadly 
relevant, but only as persuasive authority.  Such a broad-but-shallow 
approach may be useful, for example, in cases where state constitutional 
law is used to evaluate the possible practical impact of a constitutional 
rule.  Fourteenth Amendment cases considering the scope of the 
exclusionary rule may be exemplary, since the concerns involved in 
those cases are often the kinds of pragmatic considerations for which 
persuasive authority may be especially helpful.  In other situations, one 
might say that state constitutional law is only relevant in narrow 
circumstances, but that in those circumstances it effectively defines the 
federal rule, rather than just serving as persuasive authority.  This might 
be true when it comes to defining what punishments are “cruel and 
unusual,” or what rights are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and 
traditions.”42 
There is, of course, another large set of constitutional issues not yet 
addressed: those involving “structural” constitutional questions.43  If, as I 
have suggested, state and federal rights guarantees can be treated as 
analogues, why not do the same with state and federal rules regarding 
separation of powers or other structural matters?  The possibility of 
structural comparitivism with regard to structural provisions is intriguing 
and potentially fruitful, but I hold it aside here for a few reasons. 
Although there are undoubtedly many structural questions common to 
the state and federal systems—whether the executive is or should be 
“unitary,” for example44—structural provisions appear to vary more than 
rights guarantees.  State free speech guarantees are often identical to the 
text of the First Amendment,
45
 but few states have constitutional 
language akin to the Commerce Clause.
46
  This textual variance reflects a 
fundamental difference in the powers of states and the federal 
government.  The federal government, of course, may act only where the 
federal constitution gives it power to do so.  States, by contrast, have the 
 
 42. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 43. Many thanks to Josh Chafetz for encouraging me to think through these 
structural comparisons. 
 44. For one notable contribution on this point, see William P. Marshall, Break Up 
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided 
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006). 
 45. Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a 
Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 at 165-82 (1969) (comparing state bills of rights 
provisions to guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights and finding substantial similarities). 
See also id. at 138 (“Every state provides for the protection of some or all of the rights 
usually referred to as First Amendment rights.  All states, with varying degrees of 
generality or specificity, guarantee the free exercise of religion and freedom of the 
press.”). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States”). 
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general police power and can act anywhere they are not specifically 
prohibited.  As a result, “State constitutions are documents of limits, 
while the federal constitution is a document of grant.”47  Structural 
provisions in the federal constitution therefore play a fundamentally 
different role than those in state constitutions.  The federal constitution’s 
structural provisions are primarily concerned with enumerating powers 
and with dividing it not only among the branches of the federal 
government but between the federal government and the states.  To the 
extent that these concerns exist at the state level, they are not as strong. 
In any event, because the importance of state constitutional law as 
an interpretive tool varies across theories and across cases, it is 
impossible to give a single answer to the question of how often it should 
be used and what weight it should receive.  What counts as a strength for 
one interpretive theory or type of case will be a weakness for another. 
One might object that state constitutional law cannot be much of an 
interpretive tool if it is impossible to say precisely when and how much it 
is useful.  But the versatility of the tool is not a good enough reason to 
reject it outright, any more than the other tools in the constitutional 
workshop that are more useful for some jobs than others.  International 
comparativism, for example, is controversial and may not be appropriate 
in every case, but it cannot be rejected out of hand solely because it is 
difficult to say when it should be used and when it should not. 
Intranational comparativism should not be held to a higher standard. 
The more pointed version of the objection accepts this counter-
argument, and uses it as the basis for another:  Reverse incorporation 
simply gives judges yet another manipulable tool with which to write 
their own preferences into law.  This question—how to constrain the 
discretion of unelected, unaccountable federal judges—goes to the heart 
of interpretive theory and the countermajoritarian difficulty, and pithy 
answers are impossible.  And yet there is no discernible reason to suspect 
that state constitutional law will be any more subject to manipulation or 
disagreement than the many other interpretive tools the federal courts 
already employ: legislative history, text, and history itself.  Reverse 
incorporation of state constitutional law is by no means a perfect tool, 
but it is at least as useful as those that already clutter the Court’s 
workshop. 
III. GENERAL QUESTIONS 
The previous Part attempted to address some of the theory—and 
issue-specific questions—complicate any effort to give a general account 
 
 47. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. 
REV. 271, 277 (1998). 
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of reverse incorporation.  But there are also a few over-arching 
complications with the approach.  This final Part identifies and attempts 
to address a particularly important one:  In an approach that purports to 
be focused on state constitutional law, what exactly are the roles of 
states, and of constitutions? 
This Article has referred—as all of us do—to “state constitutional 
law,” as if it were always clear what counts as such.  But of course, 
defining state constitutional law is not necessarily any easier than 
defining federal constitutional law.  State constitutional law could refer 
to the documents themselves, to the gloss given by state courts, or to 
something else entirely.  In order to talk meaningfully about borrowing 
that law, shouldn’t we first define what it is? 
Yes and no.  Certainly, it would be useful if state constitutional law 
were capable of an easy definition.  Otherwise it is entirely possible that 
federal courts attempting to borrow it might simply disagree about what 
it is they should be borrowing.  This could in turn lead to complicated 
problems if, for example, federal judges disagree about whether “state 
constitutional law” is represented by a state constitution’s guarantee that 
“The individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” or 
instead by that state’s supreme court’s holding that the right is subject to 
reasonable regulation.  One might want to avoid the problem by saying 
that state courts are the final authority on the meaning of their 
constitutions, but this is not a complete answer, if federal courts are only 
looking for persuasive authority.  The text of a state constitution may 
seem more “persuasive” to a federal judge than the state court’s 
interpretation of that text.  If so, the federal court may end up borrowing 
a state constitutional doctrine that even the state’s own courts do not 
endorse. 
And yet the inevitable difficulty of defining state constitutional law 
should not be any more disabling for reverse incorporation than for 
federal constitutional law as a whole.  The fact that both are hard to 
define does not make it impossible to study or utilize them.  We teach 
federal constitutional law, after all, despite deep intellectual rifts over 
such fundamental questions as whether the beliefs of “the people” do or 
should have any role in defining our constitutional tradition.
48
  It seems 
no more troubling to speak of state constitutional law in comparably 
general terms. 
 
 48. One well-known iteration of this over-arching debate concerns “popular 
constitutionalism.”  The literature is too vast and varied to summarize, but LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004) is undoubtedly part of the canon, as is the criticism of Kramer’s work found in 
Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1594 (2005). 
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But even if we can hold aside the question of what counts as 
constitutional, another question arises:  What does it matter?  Many of 
the supposed benefits of reverse incorporation described above—
accounting for popular will and measuring practical experience, for 
example—do not seem to depend on the “constitutional” nature of the 
borrowed law.  What does one get from analyzing state constitutions that 
one does not get from, for example, analyzing state laws or taking public 
opinion polls?  If there is nothing particularly relevant about state 
constitutions qua constitutions, isn’t the approach described here really 
one about “the constitution outside the constitution”?49 
This, too, is a difficult question that does not yield an easy answer. 
The instinctive move is to say that constitutions are “different” from 
other forms of law, but that is simply a way of re-stating the question, not 
resolving it.  Establishing why and how they are different, or should be 
treated as such, requires a thicker account of constitutional law than I can 
muster here.  Suffice to say, the benefits of borrowing described here are 
not necessarily attuned to whatever it is that makes a constitution a 
constitution.  Inasmuch as state constitutional law is a useful tool for 
borrowing because of the persuasiveness of its reasoning, for example, it 
is not clear that it should carry any more weight than, say, the weight of 
academic opinion. 
And yet the instinctive reaction—that constitutional law is 
different—seems to be right.  Whatever one’s approach to federal 
constitutional interpretation, it surely does matter that state constitutional 
law is “constitutional.”  Like federal constitutional law, it is an 
entrenched statement of a community’s constitutional values, one that—
though easier to alter than the federal version—is both a statement of 
principle and an enforceable provision of basic law.  Whether this 
differentiates state constitutional law much from other forms of state law 
is a valid question, the answer to which will surely vary state by state. 
But surely it is not too much to say (at least to the audience of this 
symposium) that state constitutional law is somehow special. 
Reverse incorporation is not out of the woods yet.  For just as one 
can question the role of constitutions qua constitutions, one might also 
question the role of states qua states.
50
  If cities called their laws 
“constitutions” and treated them as such, would they be entitled to the 
same kind of respect as state constitutions?  Or, to illustrate the issue 
from a different angle:  Are different states entitled to the same “weight,” 
 
 49. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 
408 (2007). 
 50. Many thanks to Aziz Rana and Michael Dorf for raising these federalism 
questions. 
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or does California’s constitutional law matter more than Wyoming’s 
because seventy times as many people live in California?  If the states 
are not counted equally, it would seem that they are not being treated as 
valuable as states, but rather as something else—proxies for public 
opinion, perhaps. 
This is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, because the 
answer depends on the answers to the questions described above—in 
other words, on how one is using state constitutional law.  In some cases, 
it must be true that state identity is not particularly important in the 
approach described here.  If, for example, one uses state constitutional 
law simply as an indicator of contemporary constitutional values, then it 
might be true that state identity itself is not particularly important.  One 
could just as easily count local-level regulations, or perhaps even public 
opinion polls.  But one can also measure public opinion by counting 
states.  That obviously will not necessarily capture what the majority of 
the public thinks, given the differences in population across states.  But it 
would not be any less democratic than, say, the United States Senate. 
On the other hand, if one is using state constitutional law only as 
persuasive authority, then it might very well be appropriate to count 
California’s law for more than Wyoming’s or vice versa, perhaps 
because one state’s constitution or judges are “better” than the other’s.51 
The same could be said of issue-tailoring. If, for example, federal courts 
are facing some kind of federal constitutional issue with which some 
states have more expertise than others—a takings question that involves 
mineral rights, for example, or the treatment of an ethnic minority whose 
population is concentrated in a few states—then it may make perfect 
sense to count some states’ constitutional law more than others. 
This short defense of the importance of states is not meant to be 
comprehensive, but merely to show that reverse incorporation is not 
necessarily antagonistic—nor even agnostic—to federalism.  But neither 
is it possible to offer a general account of the importance of states and 
constitutions, because it will vary according to all of the metrics 
described above.  That may be somewhat disappointing, but it is a 
shortcoming common to nearly all interpretive tools.  Few, if any, offer a 
general theory of their own relevance.  The method of reverse 
incorporation described here is not alone in facing these complications. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article and the one on which it builds have attempted to 
suggest a relatively simple idea:  Federal courts should, at least 
 
 51. Let me emphasize that I have no reason to believe that this is true. 
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occasionally, use state constitutional law at least as persuasive authority, 
and perhaps even as something more.  Perhaps wrongly, I regard this as a 
relatively weak suggestion, since it does not seem like much to ask that 
the state courts’ decisions—which are accorded respect in many other 
ways, such as through jurisdictional rules that protect them from federal 
review
52—be given some persuasive weight.  But I recognize that even 
this idea is not neutral as to interpretive methodology.  That is to say, 
one’s view of constitutional interpretation is likely to color one’s view of 
the relevance of state constitutional law, as is the nature of the 
constitutional issue being addressed.  So I have attempted in these 
remarks to go a little further in describing the strengths and weaknesses 
of my thesis through the lens of some of the leading theories of 
constitutional interpretation.  I have also attempted to address some of 
the major potential objections and underlying problems with this 
proposal.  Fully resolving them is a task that will require far more work. 
 
 
 52. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 449-500 (1941) (holding 
that in most cases federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of a state law 
until state courts have had a reasonable opportunity to do so); Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971) (requiring, with limited exceptions, federal courts to abstain from 
hearing civil rights tort claims arising from criminal prosecution until after conviction); 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943) (allowing federal abstention when 
state courts have greater expertise in the matter); Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976) (allowing abstention in cases of 
parallel litigation). 
